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LETTERS OF CREDIT-AMERICAN

COMPANY FAILED TO PROVE THE

ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO WARRANT A PRELIMINARY ORDER ENJOINING AN

AMERICAN BANK FROM MAKING PAYMENT UNDER A LETTER OF CREDIT TO
AN IRANIAN BANK, EVEN THOUGH,

AS A RESULT OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLU-

TION, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT DEFAULT ON A CONSULTING SERVICES CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICAN COMPANY. American Bell Interna-

tional, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
On July 23, 1978 the Imperial Government of Iran (Imperial
Government) entered into an agreement for international communications consulting services and equipment with American Bell International (Bell), a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Telephone
and Telegraph. This agreement permitted the Imperial Government
to demand the return of its 38.8 million dollar down payment at any
time (with the exception of twenty per cent of the amounts actually
invoiced by Bell and approved by the Imperial Government). In order to secure the return of the down payment on demand, Bell was
required to establish an irrevocable and unconditional letter of guaranty in favor of the Imperial Government through the Iranian Bank
ranshahr. This letter, in turn, was guaranteed by a-letter of credit
issued by an American bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company (Manufacturers). Bell agreed to reimburse Manufacturers for
all amounts that might be paid pursuant to this letter of credit.
Following the Islamic revolution in Iran, Bell filed suit in U.S.
District Court in New York seeking to enjoin Manufacturers from
making payment on the letter of credit. Bell, which had stopped performance on the contract in January 1979, claimed that the contract
had been breached by the Imperial Government and repudiated by
the Islamic Republic of Iran in that Bell was owed a substantial
amount of money for services rendered under the contract and its
termination provisions.'
The court denied Bell's motion for a preliminary injunction. As
set forth in Caulfield v. Board of Education,I four requirements must
be satisfied before the court may grant injunctive relief. "There
must be a showing of possible irreparable injury and either (1) probable success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them fair ground for litigation and a balance

1. 474 F. Supp. at 422.
2. 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978).
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of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief."3 The court found that Bell failed to establish facts
sufficient to meet these requirements.
Bell fell short of establishing possible irreparable injury because
it had available adequate remedies at law. First, Bell would have an
action for money damages if Manufacturers paid Bank Iranshahr on
the letter of credit in violation of its terms. Second, while the court
admitted that Bell no longer had any meaningful access to the
courts of Iran (the agreement provided that Iranian law should govern the settlement of disputes arising under the contract), the company was not precluded from bringing an action in U.S. courts under
the Sovereign Immunities Act.'
Bell failed to prove probable success on the merits in that it
could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either (1)
demand under Manufacturers' letter of credit did not conform to the
terms of that letter, or (2) that the demand, having been properly
made, should not be honored because of "fraud in the transaction."
The court first considered the nonconformity issue. The demand for
payment by Bank Iranshahr was identical to the terms of the letter
of credit in every respect but one. The letter of credit named as
payee the "Imperial Government of Iran Ministry of War," whereas
the demand for payment named as payee the "Government of Iran
Ministry of Defense, Successor to the Imperial Government of Iran
Ministry of War."' The court found that, although a demand for
payment must strictly comply with the letter of credit in order to
justify payment,' a court, upon a full trial, would probably not find
nonconformity in this case. As legal successor to the Imperial Government, recognized as such by the United States,7 the Government
of Iran could properly demand payment under the terms of the letter
of guaranty which provided for payment to the Government Of Iran's
3. Id. at 610.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) provides, inter alia, that a foreign state shall
not be immune from jurisdiction of U.S. courts in any case in which the action is
based upon a commercial activity of a foreign state conducted outside the territory of
the United States which causes a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
1610(b)(2) (1976) allows attachment of property in the United States belonging to the
foreign state in aid of execution upon a judgment obtained under § 1605(a)(2).
5. 474 F. Supp. at 423.
6. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir.
1979); North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Electronics, Ltd., 67 A.D.
2d 890, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1979); Key Appliance, Inc. v. First National City Bank, 46
A.D.2d 622, 359 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 826, 339 N.E.2d 888, 377
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1975).
7. 474 F. Supp. at 423-24.
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predecessor.8

Bell's primary contention, and the issue given the most consideration by the court, was that payment on the letter of credit should
have been enjoined because the Islamic Republic was guilty of
"fraud in the transaction." The argument between the parties focused on the scope to be given the term "transaction." Manufacturers contended that the term referred only to the letter of credit
transaction and not to the underlying commercial transaction. Bell
argued that the term referred to the totality of circumstances.
Fraud in the transaction was first allowed as a theory of relief in
Sztejn v. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.' The case involved a letter
of credit secured to guarantee payment for bristles purchased by a
New York merchant from a supplier in India. The plaintiff successfully argued that the shipping of cowhair and other useless material
constituted fraud justifying enjoining payment under the letter of
credit. Since the materials shipped were not the materials ordered,
the shipping documents which were required to be presented for payment under the letter of credit were fraudulent and therefore payment was not due under the terms of the letter. While the court in
Sztejn reaffirmed the independence of the letter of credit from the
underlying contract, it also introduced the notion that the underlying transaction could be considered in determining whether documents essential for payment under the letter of credit were in fact
fraudulent even though conforming on their face to the requirements
of the instrument.
The Uniform Commericial Code of New York, which the parties
agreed was controlling in this case, attempted to codify the "fraud in
the transaction" terminology in section 5-114."' The Code allows an
issuer of a letter of credit the option to deny payment to the beneficiary when there is fraud in the transaction and the beneficiary is not
a holder in due course. The Code implies that a court of appropriate
jurisdiction can enjoin an issuer from honoring demand on a letter of
credit on a finding of "fraud in the transaction." However, the Code
does not clarify whether fraud in the transaction pertains only to the
letter of credit transaction or to the underlying contract between the
issuer's customer and the beneficiary of the letter of credit," and
cases since Sztejn, both before and after the section 5-114 addition
8. See Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 56 111. App.3d 421, 371 N.E.2d 1127
(1977), a/f'd, 76 Ill.2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979).
9. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1941).
10. N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(McKinney)(1964).
11. See 63 MINN. L. RaV. 487, 508 (1979).
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to the Code, are not consistent as to the proper interpretation of the
phrase.
The court did not determine which interpretation should be
given effect because it felt that, on either theory, Bell had not
demonstrated probable success on the merits. The court considered
Bell's allegations that the Islamic Republic had taken actions to repudiate all its contracts with American companies, but dismissed
these allegations as unproved. The court also held that Bell failed to
demonstrate "the kind of evil intent necessary to support a claim of
fraud" or that the actions of the Islamic Republic in its purported
repudiation were made with "fraudulent intent to mulct Bell."' 2
Although the court did find that these issues involved sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair
ground for litigation, it failed to find that the balance of hardships
tipped decidedly toward the plaintiff Bell. Even though Bell stood to
lose a substantial sum of money, Manufacturers stood to lose as
much or more if the letter of credit it had issued was not honored.
Manufacturers held many assets in Iran that could be subject to nationalization by the Iranian Government or to attachment by Iranian
courts in proceedings initiated by Bank Iranshahr, and Manufacturers could lose credibility in the international banking community if
it failed to make good on its letter of credit. Moreover, Bell knowingly and voluntarily entered into the contract which allowed the
Iranian Government to recoup its down payment on demand in order
to bring to Bell "both monetary profit and prestige and good will in
the global communications industry."'" Bell sought the benefits of
this commercial arrangement and the court felt that it must also
bear the burdens.
While the result of the Bell case seems to support the independent nature of the letter of credit, the dicta in the decision indicates
a willingness on the part of the court to entertain arguments relating
to fraud occurring in the underlying transaction which does not directly affect the letter of credit transaction. The court suggests that
if the demand for payment was made with the intent to defraud or
penalize Bell in its attempt to settle disputes through enforcement of
the underlying contract and its termination provisions, a court could
properly enjoin payment on the letter of credit which was established to guarantee that payment on demand.
The utility of the letter of credit in international trade is depen-

12. 474 F. Supp. at 425.
13. d. at 426.
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dent on its continued independence from the underlying agreement.
By allowing greater recognition of the underlying transaction in actions to enjoin payments under letters of credit the courts threaten
this utility. The end result is a greater burden on international trade
as parties to agreements are less able to rely on the guarantee of
payment the letter of credit is designed to secure.
If the trend to consider the underlying transaction as an integral
part of the letter of credit transaction continues, especially in cases
such as this one, where an American company has agreed to be
bound by the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, the willingness of foreign
corporations and governments to enter into agreements with U.S.
parties will be impaired. Such a move, not unlike the freeze on Iranian assets in the United States, would do little to raise the confidence of foreign businesses and governments in the American business system.
Dirk T. Biermann

